Sobre pensar e dizer o ser e o não-ser: matizes epistêmicos e semânticos da Teoria dos Objetos de Alexius Meinong

Abstract

The relation between being, saying and thinking is a central issue in Philosophy. With their due differences, since Parmenides, the central positions of the philosophical tradition – empiricism, idealism and materialism – and, thereafter, of contemporary

logic, have mostly linked saying and thinking inflexibly to being and, thereby, non- being has been excluded from the category of genuine object of thought and speech,

sometimes as meaningless, sometimes as something significant, but which is never a constituent of true expressions. However, such approaches do not seem to suit the intentional nature of thought and the ordinary use of language, since the overwhelming

majority of human discourse and thought is not restricted to being, and, in effect, non- being, besides assumed as significant, it is sometimes considered to be a constituent of

true expressions. In the context of this asymmetry between Philosophy and ordinary discourse, in the present work the epistemic, semantic, logical and ontological nuances of Alexius Meinong’s Theory of Objects are shown and analyzed, which offer bases for an alternative solution to the impasse, through of a semantic domain that subsumes both being and non-being as genuine referents in saying and thinking, considering the historical and theoretical backgrounds that comprise aspects that based motivations, problems, criticisms and changes of the meinonguian theory.